The Russian judiciary … How the Kremlin tamed the judges … Rule of the state is the same as the rule of law … Artful selection of the “right” people … The Kremlin always wins … Londongrad and rivers of looted rubles
Also, it is home to a barbaric regime entrenched by electoral fraud and a fake parliament. It murders and imprisons political opponents, brutalises protesters and neuters independent voices and the media.
It’s a gangster kleptocracy actively engaged in war crimes. No atrocity seems too great that it cannot be committed.
What does the Russian judicial system have to say about this? In a word, Nichego.
Basically, it’s a Potemkin illusion of the rule of law and an autonomous judiciary. The Constitution looks peachy, providing for protection of rights, freedom of speech, and association – but the Duma, stacked to the rafters with Putinites, has hollowed out the freedoms.
There doesn’t have to be direct political interference in the judicial process; that is ensured by selection of insiders, cultural attitudes to legal theory, constrained legal education, and judicial self-interest.
Vladimir Putin’s concept of the rule of law sums up the Russian system succinctly. In 2010, when he was prime minister, he said:
“Listen, all our opponents clamour for the rule of law. What is the rule of law? It is compliance with existing legislation. What does existing legislation say about marches? You need to obtain authorization from the local authorities. You got one? Go ahead and demonstrate. If you didn’t – you don’t have the right to demonstrate. If you do anyway – you will get a baton to the noggin’ [poluchite po bashke dubinoi]. End of story.”
A year before he said that changes were made to the selection process for Russia’s Constitutional Court. Rather than being elected by the judiciary, the country’s top judges are now appointed by the president. Two constitutional judges who had the temerity to question the change were required to vacate their seats on the court.
According to Aryna Dzmitryieva, a researcher on the rule of law at The European University of St Petersburg, “… the courts are flawed, not by reason of politicisation but rather by excessive legal positivism.”
While the law allows for decisions that are unpredictable, they are nonetheless entirely predictable because the preferences of the political sovereign are widely understood. The Kremlin always wins.
This was evident in the high profile prosecutions of Alexei Navalny, Pussy Riot and Mikail Kordorkovsky. The European Court of Human Rights was highly critical of the conduct of all those trials and of the “investigation” into the 2006 murder of journalist and Putin critic Anna Politkovskaya.
In the Navalny case the ECHR found the trial was “arbitrary and manifestly unreasonable” and he was unfairly convicted.
Much the same happens in lower-level cases. According to Maria Popova, an associate professor of political science at McGill University:
“When the Kremlin’s position is uncertain, lower-level political actors, the prosecution, and judges try to guess the politically correct outcome and this guessing game introduces significant unpredictability into the legal regime.”
Olga Romanova, the director of Russia Behind Bars, wrote for the Carnegie Moscow Centre:
“The Russian court system paralysed itself a long time ago. It doesn’t need outside experience; it doesn’t need experienced lawyers. It needs efficient personnel who know how to follow orders. The average judge renders a not-guilty verdict once every seven years. Judges understand that such a verdict will always be repealed and the repeal of a sentence is a stain on a judge’s record that could lead to penalties and even dismissal.”
Once legislation is passed by the Duma, it will be reliably enforced by the judges. A combination of judicial selection and self-interest delivers the right outcomes.
It’s the same way that conformity is ensured in autocracies like the Murdoch media, where the regime’s submissive foot-soldiers sniff the breeze and divine their master’s thoughts. The mechanisms are in place to ensure that people come up with the “right” thoughts.
Criminal prosecution is not even a necessity for the Russian state. Pro-democracy groups and media outlets can be designated as “undesirable organisations”.
In other words, Russian citizens can be named as “foreign” agents if they share reports or publish anything that touches on a long list of prohibited topics – including government financial scandals, the morale of the military, investigations into abuses in the security services, details about the Salisbury poisonings, corruption scandals, and the downing of MH17.
Once designated under the foreign agent laws it is effectively impossible for anyone in the communications business to continue to work. It is these laws that have seen the closure of many civic organisations and media outlets.
The very threat of prosecution is enough to keep a lid on dissent because anyone who is sent before the courts knows the outcome before the proceedings commence.
Judicial Qualification Boards were established in the 1990s to vet and recommend candidates for appointment to the courts.
However, there is a Presidential Commission to screen candidates for federal judgeships. Under Putin, this body has been stacked with people from law enforcement and security backgrounds.
The presidential commission rejects between 20 and 25 percent of JQB recommended candidates – without reasons.
Cronyism is rife, with lawyers and clerks currying favour with court presidents, who wield significant influence over the JQBs. This reduces the pool of judicial talent to those working as court assistants, administrative clerks, prosecutors or government lawyers.
Defence and private lawyers are rarely appointed to the bench. At the same time, legal education in Russia is highly formalistic, with little scholarship, critical thinking or notions of independence.
The chief justice of the Russian Federation is Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Lebedev – in office for 31 years. He must be doing something right. During the Soviet era he was a human resources functionary of a department of the Ministry of Industrial Construction and later was elected as a judge of the People’s District Court for Leningradskiy in Moscow.
For the oligarchs, London courts have been the preferred venue for their legal forays. And boy, have the local lawyers cashed in.
Boris Berezovsky in 2010 got a verdict from Justice Eady in the High Court for £150,000 in a libel case against a Russian state-owned TV network, RTR Planeta, who accused the businessman of murdering Alexander Litvenenko.
He also had a court victory against Forbes magazine in 2000, over an article that claimed he was involved in organised crime
In December last year, HarperCollins settled a libel case brought by Roman Abramovich, who sued over a book by Catherine Belton, Putin’s People.
The book claimed that the billionaire had bought the Chelsea Football Club on Putin’s instructions and that he was a co-owner with Boris Berezovsky the oil company Sibneft.
The settlement involved corrections and the publisher’s donation to a charity. The case in Australia was settled in December last year.
Russian oligarchs Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven along with their group Rosneft also settled their claims against the publisher and author. Fridman and Aven also successfully sued former British spy Christopher Steele and his company Orbis for data breaches.
This was in connection with the dossier about Donald Trump and his extramural activities in Moscow.
Yet, not all Russian cases brought in London are successful.
In 2013, the High Court dismissed a suit against investor Bill Browder and his UK based fund Hermitage Capital. It was brought by Pavel Karpov, a retired Russian police officer accused by Browder of tax fraud and the death of Sergei Magnitsky, the Ukrainian born tax advisor who exposed corruption and misconduct by Russian government officials.
Boris Berezovsky also failed big time in his massive $US5 billion claim against Roman Abramovich over their Sibneft fallout, the oil firm they co-founded.
Jonathan Sumption QC acted for Abramovich while the UK Supreme Court kept his seat warm for him while he hoovered up eye-watering fees until the case was concluded.
The Observer newspaper said at the time there was “the whiff of billions enveloping London’s Rolls Building like a tantalising perfume”.
In fact, it was Mrs Justice Elizabeth Gloster’s remarks in her reasons that helped the British government decide this week that Abramovich be sanctioned because of his closeness to Putin.
This involves freezing all his British assets and a travel ban.
The judge pointed out that the political lobbying activities of Berezovsky provided Abramovich with political protection (krysha) and this was “inherently corrupt”. Abramovich’s payment for these services was also corrupt.
The Home Office in 2019 identified Abramovich’s links to the Russian state as well as to “corrupt activity and practices”.
Lord David Pannick QC was accused in the press of creating sanction “loopholes”. On March 9, he explained that he had acted for Arkady Rotenberg, a close associate of Putin, in court of appeal family proceedings.
He advised on the sanctions regime then in place in the EU in response to Russia’s attack on Crimea.
The British government is moving to restrict SLAPP suits from Russian oligarchs brought in the London courts against the media and social justice campaigners.
Deputy Prime Minister and Justice Secretary Dominic Raab said:
“It cannot be right that kleptocrats and those with links to Putin can silence those shining a light on those excesses and use our courts to do so.”
Since the investor visa scheme was introduced in the UK in 1994, giving residency to wealthy foreigners, billions of pounds in legal fees have flowed into the pockets of London lawyers.
Mishcon de Reya, CMS, Harbottle & Lewis, Carter-Ruck and Schillings have raked in hundreds of millions of pounds doing Russian libel work.
Skadden Arps acted for Abramovich in the Berezovsky case with fees worth a reported £35 million.
Linklaters, Allen & Overy, Freshfields, and Baker McKenzie are all in the process of cutting back their Russian work or dumping it entirely. The Financial Times has more details here on law firms shaking out their Russian clients, also here.
Norton Rose Fulbright sent around an internal message telling staff not to speak publicly or privately about the Russian sanctions.
Norton Rose did a backflip with pike, saying it was “shocked by the tragic events unfolding in Ukraine” and was “donating to humanitarian appeals”.